In Memory of Charles Reginald CROMPTON Private 59864 10th Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment (Prince of Wales Own) who died on 25 April 1918 of gangerous (sic) wounds at No 3 Casualty Clearing Stations (CCS). Age 19. Son of Charles W and Lily CROMPTON of Hall Green, Chapelthorp (sic), Wakefield. Buried in plot I.E.31 Bagneux British Cemetery, Gezaincourt, Somme, France. The cemetery was begun in April 1918 after the close of the German offensive in Picardy. It was located near the 3rd, 29th and 56th CCS, which were established 28-29 March 1918. Source: - Commonwealth War Graves Commission Right: Charles Reginald CROMPTON taken circa 1917 in the uniform of the West Riding Regiment (Source: Peter COOPER, family photograph)

Above: Gangrenous wounds 1: Charles Reginald's cause of death - a composite image Source: Burnt Records, The National Archives (TNA), WO 363/C1256, Kew, London

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Source: Wyrall, Everard, 'The West Yorkshire Regiment in the War - 1914 to 1918, Vol.2: 1917-1918', The Bodley Head, London 1928 - volume 2 contains the casualty lists

Above: The official Director of Graves Registration photograph of Reg's original headstone in the Bagneux British Cemetery, Gezaincourt, taken in the 1920s. Right: The official Director of Graves Registration Form informing of the location of Reg's grave. Source: Peter COOPER - family archives

Above: A map locating Bagneux Military Cemetery

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Charles Reginald CROMPTON's military record

From his attestation papers it is possible to deduce that Charles Reginald CROMPTON was born in March 1899 and enlisted at the age of 17 years and 7 months. They show that he as a 'working farm pupil' being 5 feet 9? inches (1.77m), 147lbs (66.6kg) and with a chest of 39" (0.99m) expanding by 3" (0.07m). Source: TNA WO 363/C1256

Tim Lynch writes:

By 1917, the military had had time to develop a more streamlined system for processing potential recruits which included the completion of a national registration programme in 1915. As a result, the study of the draft shows the degree to which age entry had become controlled. Call up took place at the age of 18 years and one month.

Contrary to widespread belief, voluntary enlistment did not stop after 1916 and the authors of the few available conscription period memoirs are at pains to explain that they volunteered before receiving their call up papers.

Reg's military career began, at the age of 17 years and 7 months when he enlisted in Wakefield on 13 November 1916, but wasn't mobilised to the 51st Recruiting Area until 18 April 1917 at the age of 18. He reported to 6(?) TR Battn. at Rugeley Camp the following day. On 15 August 1917 he was promoted to acting Lance Corporal before reverting to his substantive rank of Private on 26 March 1918 on transfer to 3rd Res Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment at Whitley Bay the following day. The evidence gathered from the progress of the members of the draft from enlistment to training and deployment [..] shows that friends or even groups of friends could potentially remain together during enlistment and throughout their service. (Lynch) Right: Rugeley Camp, lone of two large training camps established on Cannock Chase, Staffordshire, in World War 1 Source: First World War Camps of Cannock Chase (Accessed 14 February 2010)

Above: Whilst at Rugeley, Reg was hospitalisation with measles Source: TNA, WO 363/C1256

It is not known why Reg was posted to 10^th (S) Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment ¹ (10/WYR). Formed in York on 03 September 1914 it wasn't necessarily his local battalion, being 40 miles from Hall Green. However, Wakefield may have been in the West Yorkshire Regiment's recruiting area as the 15/West Yorkshire Regiment were the 'Leeds Pals'.

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At that time certain units were under strength having been hard hit by the German March offensive. The conscripts from the class of 1899 were often sent to France under the previously imposed minimum limit of 19 years of age but having reached the age of 18 and completed at least six months of training. Whilst reports of poorly-trained conscripts are common, it follows that from 1917 onwards the majority of reinforcements had completed a minimum of six to eleven months of training before deployment. (Lynch)

Source: Tim Lynch, Unknown Soldiers – a 1918 draft, Stand To No 98, Western Front Association, September 2013

Chris Baker writes about the new recruits use to pack-out depleted battalions and those reorganised in February 1918.

The older hands tried to offer some comfort to the bewildered 18-year olds, who had recently arrived and simply could not understand what was happening.

Source: Baker, Chris, 'The Battle for Flanders German defeat on the Lys 1918', Pen and Sword Military, Barnsley, 2011, p.52

Reg, aged 19 or very nearly 19, embarked for France on 3 April 1918 with an assumed 11 months of training. On 04 April 1918, he was posted to 10/WYR joining his battalion as as one of the bewildered reinforcement draft of 08 April 1918, who had had no front line experience.

Source: War Diaries of 10/West Yorkshire Regiment, April 1918, TNA WO95/2004

Above: Reg's postings record confirms the date he joined his battalion and the date he was wounded in action as 22 April 1918 Source: TNA, WO 363/C1256

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Above: Confirmation of Reg's of death at 3CCS and an alternative, if indistinct, date when he was posted to 10/West Yorkshire Source: TNA, WO 363/C1256

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The War Diary of 10^th (S) Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment for Charles Reginald's only action

Ludendorff's advance of 23 March 1918, from the Hindenburg Line, ended on 5 April 1918 with part of the British Fifth Army's front line on the ridge at Mesnil. Further actions were to take place, during a period of fluid British defence and counter attack.

During the first part of April the 10/WYR was part of 50^th Brigade, 17th (Northern) Division, V Corps and were in Divisional Reserve and Army Reserve. They appeared to be constantly on the move, from village billet to village billet, in a clockwise elliptical circuit from Mesnil. They were never more than 25 miles (41kms) from the front, being on a standby of between ten minutes and three hours notice, depending on their distance from the front. The main preoccupation, during this time, was accommodating the 438 reinforcements (43.8% of its strength), training and brigade reorganisation.

Professor Gary Sheffield describes the situation experienced by many Divisions after the German onslaught of March/April 1918. He writes about the replacement drafts to 19th Division, similar to the three drafts sent to 10/WYR:

Moreover, most of the replacements that arrived at the front during the latter part of 1918 were extremely youthful and lacking in military experience.

The case of 19th (Western) Division, a Kitchener formation, illustrates this point. Making its debut on the Somme in 1916, it earned a reputation as a good fighting division. Committed to battle on the afternoon of 21 March 1918, it had incurred 3,800 casualties [18,000 when at full strength] by the 26th. A large number of 'boys' arrived as replacements but there was no time to ' absorb' them properly into the division before it was sent north to Messines. There, on 10 April, 19th Division was thrown into the Battle of the Lys, suffering 4,346 casualties. By May the division 'was now composed almost entirely of new drafts, many of whom were not fully trained'. Sent to the south, 19th Division became involved in the latter stages of IX Corps' defensive battle on the Aisne. Between 21 March and 19 June the Division suffered 13,000 casualties - 'or about 90 per cent of the strength of the Division'.

19th Division experienced a similar situation in the Battle of the Selle.

Its next major offensive action came during the successful Battle of the Selle in October. The losses incurred during these actions were replaced by 'considerable number of young soldiers with no previous experience of the war and very little time in which to train them'.

Source: Sheffield, Gary, 'Command and Morale', The Praetorian Press, Barnsley, 2014, p.133

Movements of 10/West Yorkshire Regt in April 1918

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Professor Peter Simkins sets the strategic scene for the 10/West Yorkshire's action in the Ancre Valley.

In the final days of March and the first week of April 1918, the Germans succeeded in establishing themselves on the west bank of the Ancre between Albert and Hamel [1.5km north-east of Mesnil], gaining possession of much of Aveluy Wood  which was a little over a mile in length and nearly a mile across. This feature was, in effect, the principal German 'citadel' on the west bank, covering the river crossings. The site of the once-pretty village of Hamel was now, in the words of the British official historian, 'a shell trap situated on a forward slope', and was wisely abandoned by V Corps. To the north of Aveluy Wood and around Hamel, the Germans rarely occupied the same position two nights running, and were hard to locate, sometimes holding one series of posts, sometimes another. More than one British officer described the Ancre valley as a happy hunting ground for night patrols. The struggle for domination of Aveluy Wood and the Ancre valley continued throughout the summer months [after Reg's death] into July, with various divisions taking their turn in the line, and raids, patrols and skirmishes were frequent. [...]

The withdrawal of 10/Notts and Derby from Aveluy Woods, 1000 yards south of Mesnil, nearly turned the 10/West Yorkshire's flank. It was heavily defended and remained in German hands until their

[...] retirement on 1 August and, the following day, the British 17th (Northern) Division had secured a north-south line across the middle of Aveluy Wood with outposts on the railway close to the west bank of the Ancre. Three days later the whole of the wood was clear of the enemy and by mid-August the German retirement to the east bank was largely complete.

He describes the topography of the Ancre valley as posing

[...] its own series of problems for an attacking force. The Ancre had been canalised at a higher level than the swampy approaches to the river [opposite Mesnil] and, because shelling had damaged the banks, much of the valley was flooded to a width of 300 yards. The main stream was now indistinguishable and the Ancre valley had become a stretch of marsh and water which was covered, in places, by a tangle of fallen trees and branches, reeds, barbed wire and mangled railway track. 'Nowhere is there any solid ground' wrote one soldier of the 6th Leicesters in the 21st Division. Bridges and causeways had been largely destroyed by artillery fire while German artillery and machine guns were ranged on the existing crossing-places. Indeed, the Ancre valley resembled a moat defending the Thiepval heights which loomed above the men of V Corps 'like a great, black hump', scarred with old trench lines.

Source: Simkins, Peter, From the Somme to Victory - The British Army's experience on the Western Front 1916-1918, The Praetorian Press, Barnsley, 2014 p.158-8 and p.167

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Between 17 and 22 April 1918 the 10^th (S) Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment was at Mesnil-Martinsart, north of Albert, holding the line of the River Ancre. The War Diary of 10^th (S) Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment describes the action.

Source: War Diaries of 10/West Yorkshire Regiment, April 1918, TNA, WO95/2004 - describing the action of 22 April 1918 when Reg was mortally wounded.

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One platoon of 'D' Coy had dug-in and placed their machine guns along the railway line. Two companies were in reserve. The 10^th Notts and Derby held the right flank. Attacking over the Thiepval ridge, German pressure broke through the embankments defences causing the West Yorks to withdraw. The Notts and Derby’s were forced back, exposing the West York’s flank, necessitating their withdrawal towards Mesnil.

Above: Map showing position of German troops and West Yorkshire Regiment on 21-22 April 1918 Source: TNA WO29/1498, Kew, London

Double click on any of the map to open a full version.

Source: Institut Geographique National Map, Somme No 80, 1999		Source: Trench map: Beaumont 17-02-1917: TNA, WO297/1498, Kew, London

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The maps above show Reg CROMPTON's final action. The map on the left shows the location of the action and the movements of the 10/West Yorkshire Regiment to the front line, and on their relief. The map on the right is a detailed map of the Battalion action, reflecting events in the War Diary. Reg's company is unknown.

Above: A panorama of the battlefield of the 10/West Yorkshire Regiment Click on the image to open a larger A4 landscape image.

Above: An aerial view of the Mesnil battlefield, showing the approximate movements of the British troops and their defensive lines.

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The defensive line. Top: One platoon of 'D' Coy along the embankments of the road, railway and River Ancrel. Below: German's position, across the green field, after 17.00. The tall trees mark Railway Ravine where a platoon of 'A' Coy tried to counter attack. Source: Author March 2007

Above: 10/West Yorkshire Regiment's H2, behind the church and to the side of the chateau, located behind the tall trees to the right background of the picture. Source: Author March 2007

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The mortal wounding of Charles Reginald Crompton 21/22 April 1918 - the action at Mesnil in more detail

Charles Reginald’s (Reg) regiment, the 10th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment (10/W Yorks), were in the line defending Mesnil Martinsart, a village sited on the reverse slope of the west bank of the valley of the River Ancre, whose flood plain contained the fluvial etangs and the Albert to Arras railway. Through the arches of the Thiepval Memorial, on the eastern heights of the Ancre, a full view of the battlefield is visible.

It was a two-brigade defence in response to a German attack, which crossed the Ancre. Both the 50th and 51st Brigades, part of 17th (Northern) Division, had two battalions in the line. From the right flank, the 51st Brigade had 7th Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment (7/Lincolns) and the 10th Battalion Sherwood Foresters, also known as 10th Battalion Notts and Derby Regiment (10/Sherwoods), in line. 50th Brigade had 10/W Yorks and 7th Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment (7/E. Yorks) in the line extending to the left flank.

The irony of the situation is that, on the night of 21 April 1918 all battalions were due to be relieved, with the 10/W. Yorks being relieved by the 10th Lancashire Fusiliers. An enemy barrage prevented this. ¹ Reg’s service record suggests he was mortally wounded on 22 April 1918, which could have been during the counter-attack, though other activities may have been the cause. It was a dirty wound causing gas gangrene, suggesting he was in the fields.

This account of the action at Mesnil is a compilation of five mutually supporting battalion war diaries and three brigade war diaries, which vary in intensity of text and maps. In some cases assumption are made that brigade orders issued and filed to one battalion, applied to the second by virtue of a distribution list. Times and facts vary in the six accounts so a consensus has been taken. The nomenclature for grid references has been standardised.

The preliminary bombardment

The general disposition of the British forces conformed to the three defensive line principles of the 1918 strategy. The Outpost Line was generally along the north-south railway embankment. The Main Line of Resistance, also known as the Reserve Line, was along the eastern facing valley side. Finally, the Support Line was on the reverse slope through the village of Mesnil. The 7/E. Yorks were specifically ordered not to move troops from the Main Line of Resistance to support a crumbling Outpost Line. Their Outpost Line was to be held ‘at all costs as long as possible in conformity to the Battalions on the flank. A counter attack [would] only be launched if a small section is penetrated’. ²

On the 21 April 1918, the Outpost Line was shelled severely all day ³ with the 10/Sherwoods losing contact with their outposts at 9am, having suffered severe casualties. At 5pm ⁴ the enemy put down a heavy barrage, principally of trench mortar (TM) and with heavy 5.9 artillery, on the Outpost and Main Line of Resistance on the 10/W. Yorks and 10/Sherwoods on their right. The bombardment extended as far north as Auchonvillers. ⁵

At 6.35pm ⁶ the barrages increased in severe intensity with TM bombardment on the two-centre battalions. When, at 6.50pm, the barrage was reduced to one round a minute, ⁷ the main German attack opened.

The German attack

On 21 April, the 10/W. York’s war diary records the initial attack.

At 6.30pm the enemy attacked from Q.35.b, and, after capturing the advanced posts of the 10th NOTTS & DERBY REGT. moved NORTH and captured four of our advanced posts situated along the Railway (Q.29.d.4.5 to Q.29.d.4.0 which were garrisoned by one platoon of D Coy. The enemy then took up a position approximately Q.29.d.4.5 to Q.35.b.3.7 During this attack enemy TM and MG fire was very severe. ⁸

To the left of 10/W. Yorks the 7/E. Yorks:

[…] at once stood-to & kept a sharp look out but no attack developed on the Bn sector. ⁹

However, their war diary notes the difficulties and danger faced by 10/W. Yorks:

The 10th W Yorks R on our immediate right were compelled to withdraw from their outposts on the railway owing to the failure of the Sherwoods to repel the enemy. ¹⁰

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By 7.30pm, 50/Brigade received a signal:

From West Yorks R – Officers patrol from front line reports enemy has crosses railway at Q.35. Coy in MESNIL formed defensive flank south. ¹¹

Twenty minutes later the 10 W. Yorks reported a platoon had been captured in square Q.29.d and twenty-five minutes later that the right platoon had been captured with the:

Enemy trying to push up The Gully [Railway View?] Patrols ordered down gully. ¹²

By 8.55pm 51st/Bde reported to 50/Bde that all was quiet. The artillery had ceased but there was no reports from their outposts, with the enemy holding a line. ¹³

In an attempt to clarify an obscure situation 51/Bde reported to 50/Bde that they had been:

Attacked from the bridge to Q.35.b.4.6 but were held up by fire from trench Q.35.a.9.4 to Q.35.a.77.88 ¹⁴

with the 10/W Yorks reporting:

Enemy holding line from Q.29.d.4.5 to Q.29.d.0.0 to wood Q.35.a. We have nobody on the road south of the gully. ¹⁵

This attack was in the general area of the brigade boundary as it hit both 10/W. Yorks and 10/Sherwoods. Although the 10/Sherwoods war diary does not have the same detail, it appears they found it harder to respond to the attack. They had lost contact with their Outpost Line by 9am that morning. Although the telephone wire was cut by shellfire at 6pm, a runner got through with the news that ‘C’ Companies Outposts, held by four platoons of roughly 78 men and three/four officers, had suffered severe casualties and that:

the enemy appeared to come down both sides of the Railway Bank and that the Outpost Line was probably now (6pm) in the hands of the enemy. ¹⁶

The Outpost’s initial SOS rockets, at 6.15pm ¹⁷, had not been seen but when a report was eventually received, the artillery responded within four minutes barrage until 7pm. ¹⁸

At 1am on 22 April 1918, 10/Sherwoods headquarters had received information from patrols and wounded men that:

it appeared that the enemy had occupied our posts along the Railway [and was holding huts between the Main Line of Resistance and the Railway and was probably digging in in the low ground immediately N. of the Railway Line: and that the garrison of C Coy was either killed, wounded or captured.

The 7/Lincolns, located in Aveluy Wood, had the same detached experience as 7/E. Yorks, noting the heavy TM and shellfire on 10/Sherwoods on their left and on their left platoon only. By 10.50pm on 21 April 1918, one platoon from the support company had been sent to the OC of the left Company for his tactical disposal.

A secret order, circulated on 22 April, summarised the situations as:

The enemy is reported to have crossed the Railway in Q.35.b and Q.29.d and is digging in on a line 100 yards West of and parallel to Railway from Q.35.b.6.0 to a point 100 yards west of the Bridge over the railway Q.35.b.5.9. The enemy has also crossed the Railway at Q.29.d and is continuing the line north. ¹⁹

At 10pm the:

Enemy [was] digging in between Q.35.b.0.7 and Q.29.d.4.6 ²⁰

resulting in, at 10.15pm, the:

Artillery were ordered to fire on the area east of the line between the gully and the Bde. Boundary.

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Above: Map showing Mesnil German attack based on trench map Beaumont 57D SE1&2 (parts of) trenches correct 17 February 1917 Click on the map to open a scalable pdf map in a new window

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Ten minutes later,

as soon as it was clear that the posts of the 51st and 50th Bde had been captured the Brigadier and Brigade Major of 51/Bde went to HQ, 50th Bde to arrange details of a combine counter attack by the left Battalion 51st Bde and the right Battalion 50th Bde to regain the posts on the railway. ²¹

At 11am the next day, a summary was reported and circulated from 51/Bde headquarters that:

1. The enemy is consolidating the line of the Railway between the point where it cuts the Brigade Left Boundary and the Bridge over the railway at Q.35.b.5.0
2. Our Left Battalion hold the outpost line as follows:-
   2 platoons in trench from Q.35.a.7.4 – Q.35.a.9.8
   One Company in trench from Q.35.a.9.8 – Q.35.b.10.75
   Stop in trench running down to railway at Q.35.b.10.75.
3. Our Left Battalion in touch with Right Battalion 50th Bde. in support line at Q.29.c.5.0
4. The huts at Q.35.b.1.4 are burnt and unoccupied by enemy.

Counter attack

Orders for the joint counter attack were issued by 50/Bde at 12.15am ²² and 51/Bde at 1.25am ²³ on the 22 April 1918.

The 10/W. Yorks war diary records that Captain TP Howe MC of ‘A’ Coy commanded the counter attacking force to recover the posts lost the previous night and reach their objectives. ²⁴

At 4.30am on the 22nd a counter attack was launched in conjunction with 10th NOTTS & DERBY REGT. to recover the lost posts. One and half Coys of the Battn were used; one Coy in front (A Coy) and two platoons in support (C Coy).

Three of the four platoons assembled on a line Q.29.c.55.00 to Q.29.c.60.50, and the fourth moved down C[ommunication]T[rench] running into RAVINE at Q.29.c.8.8.

The attack was proceeded by a detailed artillery barrage which was very weak and ineffective. The advance of the 10th NOTTS & DERBY REGT. on the right was held up by heavy TM barrage and also enfilade MG fire, and they fell back to Q.35.b.1.7. This left the right flank of the 10th WEST YORKSHIRE REGIMENT unprotected, and they were obliged to withdraw.

At 9am the line ran Q.29.c.5.0 to Q.35.b.1.7. The situation remained much changed for the remainder of the day.

They dug in from a line joining up from the right of 7/E. Yorks to the line held by the 10/Sherwoods. As the position was obscure, the 7/E. Yorks created a defensive flank from Q.28.b.6.2 to SUNKEN ROAD in Q.28.a.0.2 using the old disused trench which was wired along the switch. The reserves from ‘B’ Coy were brought up to the right reserve Company. ²⁵

The counter attack in conjunction with the Sherwood Foresters on the right failed owing to machine gun fire from the south and the fact that a portion of the attacking force lost direction. Subsequently the line held ran from Q.29.d.2.7 to Q.29.c.5.1 from which point the 51/Bde continued the line southwards. ²⁶

One company with an additional two platoons of 10/Sherwoods, having progressed forward some 100 yards to reach the line of the railway were enfiladed by heavy machine gun fire, particularly from Q.35.b.5.0, causing 10/Sherwoods to return to the line of assembly having suffered about seventy casualties. This exposed the flank of 10/W. Yorks. Another party approached the huts, which were set on fire by petrol and ‘P[hosphorous]’ bombs. ²⁷

The disposition of the 10th Sherwood Foresters at dawn were:

• 2 Coys in depth in main line of resistance and support line
• 1 Coy in trench Q.29.c.5.1 to Q.35.b.2.7
• 2 platoons in trench Q.35.b.0.7 to Q.35.a.8.2
• 2 platoons were missing from the posts on the railway ²⁸

However, the remainder of the 22 April passed quietly. ²⁹

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Above: Map showing Mesnil counter attack based on trench map Beaumont 57D SE1&2 (parts of) trenches correct 17 February 1917 Click on the map to open a scalable pdf map in a new window

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Postscript

Whilst Reg was being evacuated to hospital, 10th Lancashire Fusiliers (10/Lancs) of 52nd Brigade (52/Bde) relieved the 10/W. Yorks, who, at 9pm on 23 April 1918, moved back to billets in Forceville. At the time of relief, the 10/W. Yorks companies were located as:

• 'D' Coy Front line relief
• 'A' Coy Closer support
• 'B' Coy Support
• 'C' Coy In Reserve ³⁰

During the whole of these operations, the Battn had the following casualties. Lieut. ED DAMS missing (21-4-18) Temp Lieut JR KING killed (22-4-18), Temp Lieut S MOULSON wounded (22-4-18) Temp Lieut M DAYSH killed (23-4-18) and 77 OR killed wounded or missing. ³¹

The 10/Sherwoods had one officer and 19 OR killed with 86 ORs wounded. Three officer and 109 ORs were missing: at least 29 were killed in the counter attack (sic). ³¹

52/Bde’s war diary redraws the Main Line of Resistance now in front of Mesnil, on the land once controlled by 10/W. Yorks. Although it mentions the mutually supporting triple defensive lines, it is only specific about the Main Line of Resistance. This was now further east, running from Q.34.d.7.0 – Q.34.b.8.0 – Q.29.a.1.2 – Q.22.d.9.3 – Q.23.c.2.5 – Q.23.a.2.2. ³³

Perhaps rattled by the recent attack and loss of ground 52/Bde was specific about future defence.

Patrolling will be very active, both in order to gain moral superiority over the enemy and to combat surprise.

In the event of a serious attack the warning of the attack must be given by the troops in the Outpost Line, who will then, if forced fall back fighting to the line of resistance. If any position in the line of resistance is captured the rest of this line must old fast and an immediate counter attack to regain the position lost will be made by troops in or in (sic) rear of the line of resistance. Should immediate counter attack not succeed in dislodging the enemy, defensive flanks must be formed and deliberate counter attack be made under Battalion or Brigade arrangement, by Reserve troops earmarked for the purpose.

Special attention will be given to guarding valleys leading into our defences, wiring and Machine Gun Defences being especially strong in these localities.

The Right Flank [that was 10/Sherwoods now also relieved] is the weak flank. ³⁴

Defences were reinforced. On the Outpost Line inconspicuous improvements were made with wire strung 40 yards from the posts. However, more details were given about the defences of the Main Line of Resistance. Not wishing to be forced further back:

The wiring will be very strong – 3 belts of wire each 20 yards apart. Nearest belt at least 30 yards from the parapet. […] The trench will be 7 ft deep throughout, minimum width 7’ 6” – unrevetted fire bays where necessary. ³⁵

The defences of the village of Mesnil must have been compromised as:

The portion between Q.29.c.0.7 and 2.3 require to be re-dug and resitted immediately West of the Eastern hedge. ³⁶

There was no mention of regaining the ground lost on 21/22 April 1918.

Three days later the 10/W. Yorks began the process of moving back towards the front line by entering the Englebelmer-Millencourt Line as Divisional Reserves. On 29 April, the battalion was back in Mesnil.

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End notes

1. 7/Lincolns April 1918 War Diary records this as 6.9pm 21 April
2. 7/E. Yorks April 1918 War Diary
3. 10/Sherwoods April 1918 War Diary
4. ibid
5. 10/W. Yorks April 1918 War Diary
6. 50/Bde April 1918 War Diary
7. 51/Bde April 1918 War Diary
8. 10/W. Yorks April 1918 War Diary
9. 7/E. Yorks April 1918 War Diary
10. ibid
11. 50/Bde April 1918 War Diary
12. ibid
13. ibid
14. ibid
15. ibid
16. 10/Sherwoods April 1918 War Diary
17. 7/Lincolns April 1918 War Diary
18. 51/Bde April 1918 War Diary
19. 51/Bde April 1918 War Diary Brigade Order no 277
20. 50/Bde April 1918 War Diary
21. 51/Bde April 1918 War Diary
22. 50/Bde April 1918 War Diary
23. 51/Bde April 1918 War Diary
24. 7/E. Yorks April 1918 War Diary
25. 10/W. Yorks April 1918 War Diary
26. 50/Bde April 1918 War Diary
27. 51/Bde April 1918 War Diary
28. ibid
29. ibid
30. 10/Lancashire Fusiliers April 1918 War Diary Operation Order No 122 23rd April 1918
31. 10/W. Yorks April 1918 War Diary
32. 10/Sherwoods April 1918 War Diary
33. 52/Bde April 1918 War Diary
34. ibid
35. ibid
36. ibid

Sources: The National Archives, Kew, London (Accessed 01 November 2020)

• 10 West Yorks Regiment War Diary WO 95-2004-1_3
• 10 Sherwood Foresters/Notts & Derby Regiment WO 95-2008-2_2
• 7 East Yorks War Diary Regiment WO 95-2003-4
• 7 Lincoln War Diary Regiment WO 95-2007-1_3
• 7 Border War Diary Regiment WO 95-2008-1_3
• 50 Brigade War Diary WO 95-1999-2_3
• 51 Brigade War Diary WO 95-2006-3_2

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Gezaincourt Casualty Clearing Stations

During the engagement Reg was mortally wounded and evacuated to the one of the three Casualty Clearing Stations (CCS) hospitals at Gezaincourt, near Doullens. The single track railway at Mesnil line that brought ammunition for the onward light railway, may have been used to evacuate the wounded a distance of 19 miles/31km to Gezaincourt.

It is assumed that, having been recovered from the field to an Advanced Dressing Station (ADS), Reg would have been evacuated for further treatment. However, there does not appear to be a direct link to the Amiens-Gezaincourt-Doullens railway and the 'tent city' at Gezaincourt's 'Hospital Valley'. Here No.3CCS was based along with No.29CCS and No.36CCS. The papers of Lt. Col. James Carmichael, CO of 29CCS, his log detailing those who died in his care and the unit War Diary, details the hard pressed professionalism that tried to save Reg's life.

On 24 March 1918, under pressure from the German advance of Operation Michael, the five CCSs based at Dernancourt (known as Edgehill) were under confusing orders to pack and withdraw whilst admitting casualties. At 21.00, despite continual pleas for further Ambulance Trains (AT), 29CCS still had 1420 patients that Carmichael had to classify as 'walking wounded' and those who had to be left to the enemies care. His dilemma was resolved when the ' walking wounded' found and carried stretchers whilst others carried their 'walking' comrades. Fortunately, Carmichael was able to commandeered an ammunition train that happened to stop at the hospital sidings. 29CCS's personnel, the last to leave Dernancourt's hospitals, eventually boarded empty railway trucks and fell asleep on their way to Doullens. At 01.00 on 25 March the train was stopped by enemy bombing leaving the hospital personnel to march the remaining 21 miles.

Iain Gordon describes 29CCS's arrival at Gezaincourt and their struggle to become operational.

On the morning of Tuesday 26 March 1918, the men of 29CCS woke refreshed after their best night's sleep in almost a week. […]

Their feet taken care of, the unit was marched to the site, south-west of the village [of Gezaincourt] where the casualty clearing stations had previously been encamped during the desperate Somme battles of 1916. […] There were also two other CCSs there - 3 CCS, their old colleagues from Grevillers, and 56CCS, which had been the base unit at Edgehill before the attack and had managed to bring thirty-two lorry loads of hospital equipment with it from Edgehill. Under instructions from the assistant director medical services (ADMS) at Doullens, the tents and equipment were pooled between the three units and they started pitching camp. Before the tents were half up, however, the casualties started to arrive.

The three COs had a hurried conference and decided that, until they were properly established and equipped, and could recommence working as separate units, 56CCS would do all the paperwork, 3CCS would receive stretcher cases and 29CCS the walking wounded. […] There had been steady rain throughout the week and it had been bitterly cold, which caused great difficulties with pitching tents. Towards the end of the week it became warmer, although the rain became heavier. All men who weren't engaged in admitting patients were set to trenching tents, deepening drainage ditches and spreading cinders on the floors and paths. Eventually the tents and marquees were all erected, and the wards and theatres were set up and equipped to recommence operating as an independent hospital.

The hospital site at Gezaincourt lay in a valley between two ridges of slightly higher ground, which gave some protection from winds but made drainage difficult. […] The following day it rained solidly, at times very heavily, but by the evening the three COs had decided that they would be ready to start operating independently from 1 p.m. the next day. […]

By Friday 29 March, it could fairly be said that the enemy advance had been halted. […]

On Wednesday 3 April, the MOs and RAMC personnel of 29CCS were delighted to see the return of the sisters, with the arrival of six nurses from No. 6 Stationary Hospital at Prevent. They were joined two days later by two more - Sister I.M. Greaves QAIMNSR from Abbeville and Sister J. Miller QAIMNSR from No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital, which was at the time operating from the nearby Citadelle of Doullens. Later she would have cause to be eternally thankful for this posting.

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[See Canada and the First World War] Accessed 14 February 2020)

The sisters arrived just in time for a surge in admissions from 5-9 April as a result of very heavy fighting in Aveluy Wood, north of Albert, which was now occupied by the enemy, and around the village of Hebuterne. On 5 April there were 377 admissions and 345 the following day; of these, forty-one were gas cases. […]

On the day Reg was wounded, Aveluy Wood was on the 10/West Yorkshire's right and was held by 10/Notts and Derby. See map above.

In the area where the frontline passed between Bouzaincourt and Aveluy the enemy held the high ground, which denied the British a view into the Ancre Valley. The 38th Division was therefore ordered to capture this ground, while the 35th Division guarded their left flank in Aveluy Wood and the Australians provided artillery support to the right. […]

At the Gezaincourt field hospitals the wounded poured in through-out the night, and for several days thereafter. On 22/23 April alone [the date Reg was wounded], 29CCS received 244 wounded from the front and during the ensuing week buried seventeen men of the 38th (Welsh) Division in the cemetery at Gezaincourt.

Source: Gordon, Iain, 'Lifeline - a British Casualty Clearing Station on the Western Front, 1918, 2013, The History Press, Stroud, ISBN 978 0 7524 8996 4, pp.46-52

Had Reg survived to be evacuated to a base hospital he would have boarded an ambulance train. The Imperial War Museum's (IWM) photographic archive 'publicity' photograph, taken two days after his death, shows an AT where everything appears calm, look immaculately clean and white. Left: Interior of a Ward on a British Ambulance Train. Near Doullens, 27 April 1918. Source: IWM - Q8749

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Above: German Offensive in Flanders. French and British wounded having their wounds dressed in a British Ambulance Train near Doullens. 27 April 1918. Source: IWM - Q8736	Above: German Offensive in Flanders. French and British wounded having their wounds dressed at No.29 Casualty Clearing Station, Gezaincourt. 27 April 1918. Source: IWM - Q8735

Above: Gezaincourt tent city October/November 1916	Above: 3CCS nurses quarters, Gezaincourt, unknown date

See also: Location of hospitals and Casualty Clearing Stations in the Great War (Accessed 14 February 2020)

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Bagneux Military Cemetery in March 2007

Along the now abandoned and rusty Amiens to Doullens railway track, which once transported the wounded to the hospitals, lies the Bagneux Military Cemetery where Reg was interned after his death on 25 April 1918. It was the usual practice for the dead to be buried adjacent to the hospital.

In death, Reg CROMPTON is honoured by the idyllic Bagneux Military Cemetery which stands isolated up a farm road that winds its way out of the centre of Gezaincourt village. Its regimented headstones tumble on two axes toward the valley floor and the morning sun. The Stone of Remembrance stands on a raised dais, which supports sandstone pillars at each corner and over looks the flat valley floor once strewn with hospital tents and known as 'Hospital Valley'.

Above: The cemetery grave registration entry Right: Two photographs of the Cross of Sacrifice Below: The Doullens to Amiens railway, used by the ambulance trains Bottom right: The Stone of Remembrance - looking towards 'Hospital Valley'

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Above: Reg's headstone, March 2007	Above: The author at Reg's grave March 2007

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The final statements

On 24 July 1918 Reg's effects were sent home. Charles William CROMPTON acknowledged their receipt, at Hall Green, on 26 July 1918. Army Form B.104-126, from No 2 Infantry Records at York, lists them as:

Above: Reg's belongings on Army Form B.104-126 as returned to Hall Green Source: TNA, WO 363/C1256

On 23 August 1919 Charles H IVENS, vicar of Chaplethorpe near Wakefield, witnessed Charles William CROMPTON's signature on Army Form W.5080. This records and confirms:

• Reg had neither wife not children;
• His father was Charles William CROMPTON of Hall Green, Wakefield;
• His mother was Annie Elizabeth CROMPTON;
• His full blooded sisters were Lela Wright CROMPTON aged 16 and Ruthie Wright CROMPTON aged 11.

Source: Army Form W5080, WO363/C1256, TNA, Kew, London

Some time after Reg's death the family dedicated a chair, in York Minster, to his name. However, shortly after midnight on 09 July 1984 the Cathedral was struck by lightning. It took around 150 fire fighters from across North Yorkshire two hours to bring the blaze under control. A letter, from the Minster assured the family that Reg's chair was safe. But on subsequent visits it has been impossible to find the chair, even with the help of guides.

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Perhaps the more impressive memorial to Reg is the view from Lutyen’s Thiepval Memorial to the Missing of the Somme, where 72,112 names are commemorated. When the many thousands of visitors look through the central arch, over the 300 French and 300 British graves, few will appreciate that they can see the whole of Reg’s final battlefield. Right: The Mesnil battlefield from the Thiepval Memorial. Mesnil can be seen in the trees beyond the field. Battalion headquarters were in the field where the central trees dip. 'A' Coy defended the thin line of trees in front of the plough land. Source: Author March 2007

On Friday 30 May 2009 Professor Richard HOLMES, late Wellington Professor at Southampton University, spoke at Chipping Norton Theatre, Oxfordshire. He said, 'Look through the monument to the people and their battles. Look through Thiepval at Jacob's Ladder.' This was the communication trench which ran from Mesnil north-easterly direction to the River Ancre (see top of trench map). It is not know whether he was referring to the action in 1918.

Mesnil-Martinsart yesterday and today

Above: 'British transport passing the ruined church in Mesnil, December 1916' Source: IWM Q.1747

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The photograph, taken after the closure of the Somme campaign, creates an atmosphere for the occupation of Mesnil by the 10/West Yorkshire Regiment in April 1918. It is possible to suggest that, because of relative inactivity on this front, Mesnil remained much the same. The entrance to the field housing Batt H2 is between the houses on the left of the photograph. The modern village appears to have been rebuilt on the footprint of these ruins. The pile of rubble and the hollow gable end have been replaced by the buildings seen across the road from the church.

Before World War One the village had a population of 800 people. They were evacuated when the village was used as a depot for British troops; the 63rd Royal Naval Division was stationed here in preparation for the November Battle of the Ancre Heights ending the Somme campaign. Many natives never returned. The Church, perhaps because its tower could be used as an observation post, was destroyed in the war and rebuilt between 19?? and 1929. The materials and weathering of the other buildings would suggest a similar date. Now about 100 people live in this tidy and well kept collection of red bricked houses and farm and farm buildings. There is no shop or school and the Church, though well maintained, is closed and shows no evidence of a rota of service. Sadly a dying village ....

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Supporting accounts

In Chapter IX of 'Undertones of War' Edmund Blunsden describes his experiences in the Mesnil area during the campaign of 2 September 1916. He shares many of his locations with Reg.

'... Presently we reached an empty village called Mesnil, which, although it stood yet in the plausible shape of farmhouses and outbuildings, not shattered into heaps, instantly aroused unpleasant suspicions. Those suspicions were quickly embodied in the savage rush of heavy shrapnel shells, uncoiling their dingy green masses of smoke downwards while their white-hot darts scoured the acre below. On the west side, a muddy sunken lane with thickets of nettles on one bank and some precarious dugouts in the other led past the small brick station, and we turned out of it by two steps up into a communication trench chopped in discoloured chalk. It smelt ominous, and there was a gray powder here and there thrown by shell-bursts, with some of those horrible conical holes in the trench sides, blackened and fused, which meant "direct hits" and by big stuff. If ever there was a vile, unnerving, and desperate place in the battle zone, it was the Mesnil end of Jacob's Ladder, among the heavy battery positions, and under enemy observation.

Jacob's Ladder was a long trench, good in parts, stretching from Mesnil with many angles down to Hamel on the River Ancre, requiring flights of stairs at one or two steep places. Leafy bushes and great green and yellow weeds looked into it as it dipped sharply into the green valley by Hamel, and hereabouts the aspect of peace and innocence was as yet prevailing. A cow with a crumpled horn, a harvest cart should have been visible here and there. The trenches ahead were curious, and not so pastoral.

Ruined houses with rafters sticking out, with half-sloughed plaster and crazy window-frames, perched on a hillside, bleak and piteous that cloudy morning; derelict trenches crept along below them by upheaved gardens, telling the story of savage bombardment. ... The front line lay over this brow, and descended to the wooded marshes of the Ancre in winding and gluey irregularity. Running through it towards the German line went the narrow Beaucourt road, and the railway to Miraumont and Bapaume; in the railway bank was a look-out post called the Crow's Nest, with a large periscope. South of the Ancre was massive high ground, and on that a black vapour of smoke and naked tree trunks or charcoal, which I found was called Thieval Wood. The Somme indeed! ...

... The battalion moved up to a straggling wood called from its map reference P. 18, near the little town of Mailly-Maillet. Here, three miles from the enemy's guns, it was thought sufficient to billet up in tents (and those, to round off my posthumous discontent, used specimens). Mailly-Maillet was reported to have been until recently a delightful and flourishing little place, but it was in the sere and yellow; its long chateau wall was broken by the fall of shell-struck trees; its church, piously protected against shrapnel by straw mats, had been hit. ...

... I went up next night with some heavy materials for the dump in Hamel, carried on the limbers. ... At Mesnil church, a cracked and toppling obelisk, there were great craters in the road, and when one of the limbers fell in, it was necessary to unload it before it could be got out. While this delay lasted, in such a deadly place, my flesh crept, but luck was ours, and no fresh shells came over to that church before we were away. The journal into Hamel that evening was unforgettable. One still sees in rapid gun-lights the surviving fingerpost at the fork in the unknown road. It helped us. ...

... On the evening of September 2, the battalion moved cautiously from Mailly-Maillet by cross-country tracks, through pretty Englebelmer, with ghostly Angelus on the green and dewy light, over the downs to Mesnil, and assembled in the Hamel trenches to attack the Beaucourt ridge next morning. ...

...Orders for withdrawal were sent out to our little groups in the German lines towards the end of the afternoon. ... Mesnil was its vile self, but we passed at length.'

Source: Blunden, Edmund, 'Undertones of War', R.Cobden-Sanderson, London, 1928 (Accessed 14 February 2020)

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The defence of Dernancourt

On the night of 27 March 1918, Australian soldiers of the 47^th Battalion (Queensland and Tasmania) and 48^th Battalion (South Australia and Western Australia) moved across fields to take up positions along the Albert to Amiens railway embankment facing Dernancourt and along the line as it curved away to the north–east towards Albert.

Dernancourt itself suffered considerably that day. Knowing it to be held by the Germans, the British artillery bombarded the village until 2 pm when enemy soldiers were seen leaving. However, when Australian troops went forward to scout out the situation, enemy fire from the village drove them back with heavy casualties. To assist in the possible reoccupation of Dernancourt a company of the 45th Battalion (New South Wales) was ordered forward. They were badly hit as they made their way down the hill towards the railway embankment.

Private Edward Lynch, of the 45^th Battalion, recorded his part in the defence of the railway embankment south of Albert and his part in the counter attack. Though lacking etangs, the River Ancre meanders to the southeast parallel to the railway embankment. The land rises gently to the northwest. However, Dernancourt lies in the valley whilst Mensil-Martinsart is on the reverse slope of the valley side.

Perhaps even though the German attack and the British artillery bombardment lacked the intensity of Dernancourt, it is possible that the 10/West Yorkshire Regiment shared many similar experiences on between 21 and 22 April 1918.

‘Now I am watching the railway embankment again. Some men are carrying stretchers about. Clouds and clouds of black dust and smoke leap skywards at each shell burst. Two shells land together. Two black funnels of earth and smoke viciously kick upwards. There's nothing more solid in the mountain of dust. Something spinning and turning in the dust cloud. Something like a thick catapult fork. A man with neither head nor arms, flying high above the embankment. ………

……… It's after nine o'clock. Over two hours since the barrage began, and no sign of slackening yet. Our brains can't house this awful swelling sound much longer. Surely our heads will explode! The buzz, buzzing within our brain must find a way out. Heads weren't made to hold this noise!

Still we hang on, taking turns to look over the parapet with not a straight nerve in our bodies. Shattered and shaking, but grimly holding on through it all. The shelling has been on for two and a half hours, and seems like keeping on forever as Fritz mean to smash us up properly before launching his infantry. ………

……… Wounded men are everywhere waiting for the shelling to ease before they can get out. Dead men, many of them half buried, are everywhere along the trench. Many of our dead have bandages on, telling that they had already been wounded before getting their final issue.

Many men are huddled against the wall of the trench. White faces stained whiter still by the flying chalk dust. Some men have the appearance of dead men except for their jerky breathing.

Suddenly the shelling is off us. The men are flying, rifles in hand, to line the parapet. From out in front I catch the rattle of machine-guns and rifles.

'They're coming!'
'Stand to!'
'Give it to 'em!'.

I see dazed, hopeless, despondent poor beggars rising from the floor of the trench like dead men from the grave, warmed back to life by the thought of getting some of their own back. ………

……… Thousands of Fritz are rushing the railway embankment from everywhere. We’re bowling them over, but nearer to the embankment they draw. The ground behind is carpeted with grey forms that lie still, that twitch and kick, lashing the ground in agony, but hundreds and hundreds of other grey forms are leaping from shell hole to shell hole and ever drawing nearer to the few men left on the embankment.

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Desperately we aim and fire to stem that closing grey wave. Many fall, but others rise in their places. Fritz is jumping through hell, but never slackens in that deadly advance. Sheer weight of numbers is carrying them towards our men.

‘My God! I never thought it was in ‘em!’ Snow exclaims, unable to hide his admiration for the men who advance in the face of what we’re giving them.

Wounded men are now seen running back from the embankment as Fritz gets there. Men stand and throw bombs at them, but still they close in on our chaps. We see two platoons leave our trench and race down to reinforce the 47th men on the embankment. Two more platoons race ahead and take up positions a little way behind the embankment.

In a couple of places, Fritz is now on the embankment as our men come back, then they finally take the embankment. Slowly our men are dropping back, firing as they come. Dragging or carrying their wounded with them. With a rush they’re into some trenches behind the embankment. The enemy, now lining the embankment, is firing at them and at us. The rifle duelling is ear-splitting. Still we keep on firing and firing. Men in this trench are stopping Fritz lead now, but we’ve got a score of Fritz for every one of us who gets hit.

Fritz is now advancing from the embankment, but falters as our two platoons down there pour in deadly rifle and machine-gun fire. He’s racing back for the shelter of the embankment! We’ve stopped him, though he’s taken the embankment. Then Fritz is coming again in front of us. More terrific firing and more bomb work below, the overwhelming odds are telling and the remnants of our front line are falling back and jumping into support trenches.

Fritz is well up the ridge now and above Dernancourt. They’ve made a fair advance, but every yard of it is marked by a fallen man. He’s bought his gain at tremendous cost! He still has to shift us if he wants all the ridge, as he undoubtedly does.

Time goes by. All is still, except for movement as wounded men try to crawl in. We expect the attack to be renewed any minute against a mere handful of men in those old support trenches between us and the enemy. Our turn next and we know it. Can we hope for better luck than the 47th? It’s not possible that any men can fight harder or braver than they did, but the terrific odds outbalanced them. Our officers are coming along the trench. ‘ Prepare to advance. We’re going forward to reinforce the front line.' And we get set to hop-over. ………………

……… Across the open and strung out, our platoons keep perfect parade-ground formation. Enemy machine-guns and rifles start up and men start dropping everywhere. Still we advance. Still that perfect parade-ground formation is kept despite flying bullets and falling mates, kept when each man knows any step may be his last, kept without an order or a direction given. Yet they say the Australians lack discipline — the biggest lie of jealous lying criticism.

We're nearing Fritz. We can see the steel helmets above the rifle-lined trench. On we go. The man next to me spins and gives a soft surprised gasp. The poor wretch staggers in front of me. I go cold and sick as I see the shuddering convulsion of his death shiver. He's down. I'm stepping over him like a man in a dream.

Another few yards. My foot strikes on something soft. I stumble over a man just fallen. He rolls over dead and I recognise him as the men begin to yell and shout. I'm running on with the rest, doing a desperate bayonet charge over the last hundred yards. The enemy are leaving the trench! They won't face our bayonets! They won't stand and fight it out! They're off! Running!

Source: Lynch, EPF, (Ed. Davies W) ‘Somme Mud – The Experiences of an Infantryman in France, 1916-1919’, Doubleday, Great Britain, 2008, pages 209-214

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The 10th (Service) Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment was formed at York on 3 September 1914 as part of the K(itchener)2 recruitment. On 1 July 1916 the 10/West Yorkshire Regiment sustained 720 casualties, the most of any battalion on the opening day of The Somme. In Fricourt New Military Cemetery 159 of the 210 burials are of 10/West Yorkshire Regiment, placed in four mass graves. The sea of identical regimental badges, on headstones, brings home the enormity of that days casualties. The Battalion was disbanded in 1919.

Gas gangrene Gangrene is the death of body tissue. Gas gangrene is a fast-spreading and potentially life-threatening form of gangrene caused by a bacterial infection. It gained recognition for its wartime incidence. During World War I, gas gangrene complicated 6% of open fractures and 1% of all open wounds. On the Western Front (1914- 1918) 1.8 in 1000 cases involved gar gangrene. It represented 10 to 12% of all Germans who died of wounds. Severe trauma to the major blood vessels would be usual wartime causes: a deep lacerating shrapnel wound or a major wound to the calf or parts of the thigh could cause the lower leg and foot to become gangrenous. If the blood supply was not compromised, then local gangrene can still result from the destruction of tissue. A main cause of gas gangrene was damage to muscle tissue from bullet wounds where there was deep contamination from the debris from the clothing pushed into the wound. After a few days exposed to the filth in the trench one can imagine the state of uniforms. In Reg's case he was exposed to both bullets and trench mortars fragments. The usual cause is Clostridium perfringens, though other Clostridial species are implicated in about 20% of cases. Clostridium perfringens is a common soil contaminant in soil heavily fertilized with animal manure, exactly the kind of soil on which the fighting in France was fought. Once Clostridium gets started, it produces a toxin that causes the infected tissue becomes swollen and fluid that seeps from the wound may be frothy with the gas produced by the organism. There is a characteristic smell associated with the fluid. The infection may spread so rapidly up the muscle bundles that death from gas gangrene of an entire limb has been known to occur within 16 hours from the time of injury. Gangrene is caused by loss of blood supply to some or all of a limb. If the skin surface remains intact and there is no infection, you will get 'dry' gangrene. The skin dies and the underlying tissue will appear black. If the skin breaks down, or is damaged as part of the trauma, then infection will occur causing 'wet' gangrene. There are lots of bacteria that will infect dead tissue, giving rise to the 'wet' fluid that has the rotting odour. Clostridium infection may occur in these situations but is not the major cause of this type of problem. In the pre-antibiotic era, death was very common and the limb had to be amputated very quickly if the person was to be saved. It was found that the fatal sepsis and gas gangrene of wounds could be avoided if effective operation was performed within thirty- six hours of their infliction, and all dead and injured tissue removed, in spite of the extensive mutilation incurred, exposing the anaerobic bacteria to oxygen which kills it. However, the treatment rarely worked. Even with antibiotics and anti-toxin, the mortality is very high - as much as 30%. The lack of oxygen in the area of the infection means lack of blood supply, which in turn means that antibiotics find it difficult to get to the infection. Source: Great War Forum (Accessed: 30 September 2014)

This page was created by Richard Crompton and maintained by Chris Glass			Version D28 Updated 07 November 2020